Phil welcomes everyone and thanks Stephen Recker of Virtual Gettysburg and Winds of Valor. He will present 14 statements and then open the session for Questions and Answers.

 1.         Gettysburg would be the last engagement in the American Civil War where two armies massed their artillery firepower as it fought in open country. Civil War Artillery at Gettysburg describes the state-of-the-art for the artillery branch as it was during this period and uses the battle to illustrate the practical uses of this technology in combat as well as artillery’s deficiencies.   The book  examines artillery’s role, organization, men, equipment, ammunition, tactics, and performance.  Readers should conclude that there were significant differences between the two army’s artillery branches, especially organization, as well as common problems confronting operations which had a significant effect on the battle’s outcome. In retrospect, attaining consistent quality and reliability for artillery pieces and related supplies was never fully realized during the Civil War.

2.        The following statements were selected for this discussion and cover a partial list of subjects described in the book. The brevity of live chat does not allow a smooth transition between subjects in the presentation and, for that, I apologize. Your questions and/or just comments are welcomed. Before I get in to the remarks, I wish to thank Bruce Bump and all those at Winds of Valor for producing this event, Stephen Recker at http://www.virtualgettysburg.com for supplying the live chat resources to allow the event, and you, the participants and viewers who keep the discussion of Civil War history alive and continually interesting through the transfer of information, opinions, and perspectives. Now, to the statements:

3.        Confederate artillery disadvantage:  Artillery, when used offensively, had greater disadvantages over its defensive use:  Offensive action often divulged the intentions of the attack.  The more belligerent an offensive artillery force was, like the 7/3 cannonade, the less effective artillerymen were; offensive cannonades caused the defenders to respond in kind;  smoke generated by both sides obscured the field, making targets  invisible;  poor visibility reduced artillery’s killing power or, at the very least, caused random damage rather than intentional damage;  ineffective artillery fire not only failed to demoralize the defenders, it raised their feelings of invincibility.

   Defensively, the enemy could lay low and make plans to receive the attack accordingly. To protect advancing infantry from premature shell explosions, the offensive artillery switched to the least effective ammunition, solid shot, while the defenders would eventually resort to the most effective, canister.

 4.        Organizational difference: The Union army had only one battery with mixed models of guns.  Two-thirds of the Confederate batteries had at least two different types, some had three different models in four-gun batteries.  Mixed guns had the advantage of versatility, providing firepower with different ranges and killing power. A battery of short-range guns only, for example, could not respond to enemy batteries firing from long-range, thus making it unable to participate.  On the other hand, with mixed batteries, it was beneficial to have some shorter-range guns present when fighting was close-up because of their superior killing power over longer-range guns.    

  The disadvantages with mixed batteries, however, outweighed the benefit of versatility in firepower.  Gun crews could not easily switch to operating different models in battle.  Each model had different loading and safety procedures, barrel lengths varied, different implements were used, each model used different types of ammo, complicating handling and re-supply, different rifled guns had different rifled twist rates, and the projectiles’ trajectory performed differently between models.

 5.        Common problem:  While technology was advancing with respect to the availability of longer range artillery pieces, comparable progress in developing ammunition to exploit range had not yet occurred.  Smokeless gunpowder was not invented until after the war.  Rifled guns had two potential disadvantages over smoothbores: 1.  Smoke, obscuring the target area, often canceled out the benefit of longer range weapons. [Long range guns, however, were needed because the enemy had them and there were often opportunities for their use.  For example, counter-battery fire or sniping back and forth was effective when the atmosphere was clear.]  But range didn’t mean much when battles heated up and smoke obscured the field.  2.  More importantly, rifled guns’ small bore size produced only half the killing power of a big-mouthed smoothbore.  Gaining range at the expense of killing power was a dilemma facing commanders arming their force.  An army had to be careful not to overload its artillery branch with the wrong type of gun.

6.        Confederate artillerymen, compared to their Union counterparts, undoubtedly suffered more from uncertainty in the performance of their equipment and supplies because of persistent problems in manufacturing or access to raw materials.  The frequency of the participants’ complaints, however, indicates that this issue was widespread and was not isolated just to the Confederate army.  Measuring and comparing the quality and performance of ammunition between the two armies is impossible.  Judgments made by examining the resultant artillery damage at Gettysburg does not allow one to conclude that either side had superior quality in ammunition.  The reliability issue, nevertheless, appears to be an important influence affecting the ability to fight at the battle of Gettysburg.

7.        With regards to judging quality of ammunition, the large number of unexploded shells found at Gettysburg can be misleading.  One of the exhibits at the Visitors Center, years ago, mentioned that 55% of the artillery shells were duds.  However, some of the “duds” were deliberate.  During the war, if supplies of solid projectiles were depleted, it was a common practice to substitute an explosive projectile, without a fuse, and use it as a solid projectile.  Performance was nearly the same.  In fact, the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg had no solid rifled projectiles in their inventory.  Carrying fewer types of projectiles in the ammo chests actually increased versatility by allowing the choice of an explosive projectile to be used either way.  For the Union artillery at Gettysburg and beyond, the prescribed mix of projectiles to be packed in ammo chests included only shell, case shot, and canister. 

8.        Common problem:  The duties for either army’s chief-of-artillery did not normally include front line control of guns. Authority was assigned to infantry commanders controlling that front. The duties of the chief of artillery were primarily administrative.  Comparatively, Union chief of artillery, Gen. Hunt, had the responsibility where he controlled all reserve guns in a reserve status whereas Pendleton did not control one single gun in the Confederate artillery force. The chief of artillery did not exercise command of front line guns unless specially ordered by the commanding general.

This separation of command duties was blurred at Gettysburg.  While Gen. Hunt, through Meade’s order on 7/2, gained temporary control of front line guns, it sparked the eventual disagreement between Hunt and Hancock on 7/3 as the when the guns should respond in the cannonade.

12.  In comparison, the ground Meade occupied for defensive artillery purposes was not as attractive.  Both flanks ended on hills either too rugged to place many guns or too wooded for sweeping artillery fire.  The steep slopes of Little Round Top and East Cemetery Hill had artillery blind spots concealing approaching enemy infantry. Other ground faced intervening ridges which masked the enemy’s approach and some ground contained marshy or rocky terrain, challenging for gun placement.

 Having said that, the chief advantage for defensive artillery was the Union line’s internal configuration, providing quick access for rear support, which fed resources to the front from roads adjacent and parallel to the battle line.  With this fortunate condition, Meade could and did react quickly to the unfolding plans of the enemy at anyplace in the line.  It was crisis management at its finest moments. Feeding men and guns onto the field at the right place and time saved the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg.  Credit must also be given to the determination of Union artillerymen.  Defensive artillery could not normally protect itself without supporting infantry, but it did on more than one occasion at Gettysburg.  Given the number of artillery pieces and the shorter battle line, the Union army had the ability to pack more guns along its line than the Confederates.  Theoretically, the Union army had 120 guns per defensive mile, the Confederate army had only ninety guns per defensive mile.  Had the offensive/defensive roles been switched, while the respective armies held the same ground, the results would be unimaginable.  Considering artillery hardware only, who outgunned who at Gettysburg?  Considering artillery tactics only, who performed better?

 13.    The Army of Northern Virginia’s chief of artillery, General Pendleton is generally given poor marks for his performance at Gettysburg.  On July 3^rd, given that he was viewed as the coordinator of the cannonade, and given the length of the line he had to work with, a small staff, the disconnect in coordination caused by the gap of artillery between  Seminary Ridge and Benner’s Hill, and the last minute change in plans to assault a different point, how do you rate Pendleton in this regard?  If poorly why and what should he have done?

 14.    Concluding with a “what if” statement: Little attention has been given by historians or discussion groups regarding the deliberate inaction of Gen. Meade, Hunt, and some corps commanders’ in deciding to allow the Confederate artillery to form offensive positions, relatively unhindered, before their eyes on the morning of July 3rd and form an artillery force superior to the Union guns on Cemetery Ridge. Had the Confederates broken through on July 3^rd, imagine the inquisition by members of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War in the aftermath. We are spoiled by knowing the end results and can now see how brilliant this decision was. One must admire the restraint shown in holding back instead of destroying the artillery threat on their front, especially with adjacent artillery actions involved with the Bliss farm and other nearby action.  What would you have done?

Questions and Answer Period

 How do you rate a gun as being offensive or defensive to come up with guns per mile?

 Just a theoretical calculation. The CSA had about 270 guns firing at a three mile wide target – the Union line.

 This is the first time I heard that term – did you count all guns in determining that?

 No, it wasn’t really applying to a real situation but just a way to compare line length with gun power.

 In your opinion did the inferior ammunition of the Confederacy have any perceptible effect on the infantry?

I suppose both sides thought their ammunition was the worst since it didn’t perform for them. Damage done can be a rough guess as to its performance.

 Regarding what you discussed in article 7 – how could one determine whether a particular artillery shot was a dud or merely solid shot?

 You couldn’t on the receiving end. Damage was about the same. A relic hunter could tell if the fuse was prepared to be a dud or a nonfused shot.

 In article 5 – 2, you mention a mix of guns. Was this preset or officers’ discretion?

 Mixed guns came about more often by luck. If you captured a prize Northern made gun, you wanted it as a trophy. A large portion, 30% or more, were captured. The CSA wanted uniform batteries before Gettysburg, but Pendleton thought it would have affected morale. You come to know your baby and don’t want to part with it. It was traditional to have a section of smoothbores and rifled guns.

At what rate of fire would the guns have been obscured by the smoke and did it vary between types of guns? Napoleons versus rifles…

 Smoothbores used 2-1/2 pounds of powder. Rifled ten-pounders used 1 pound of powder. There is the difference. I expect a cannonade like 7-3 obscured the field 15 minutes into the start. General knew it was part of the action, and counted on it for some personal protection. In thick smoke, you didn’t take it personal if you were shot at.

 Did the gun crews prefer to work smoothbore or rifled guns? Which were safer to stand behind? Was there a status of one over the other?

 I’d prefer the killing power of a smoothbore. Attackers were much more afraid of a Napoleon than a 3-inch gun. It depends on what they got used to. Parrotts were more dangerous from bursting. The Ordnance gun was the safest and strongest iron gun. Long range you prefer a rifled gun. I suspect they kidded one another about which gun was best. Smoothbores are easier to load. Rifled grooves hid sparks, and sometimes were not extinguished during the sponging step

What is your opinion of Alexander and Hunt on Day 3?

 I think Alexander did great. Pendleton got a bad rap for all his assigned responsibilities. Who else could you blame? Hunt was magnificent and one of the heroes of the battle.

 Could Ewell have done anything artillery-wise to help on Day 3?

 He did participate against Cemetery Hill and overshoots toward Cemetery Ridge. But between Benner Hill and the next nearest artillery battery on Seminary Ridge there was a quarter mile gap.

 What is your take about confederate artillery positions along Hanover Road for the attack on ECH? Was it feasible? I don’t believe Ewell thought so and I wonder why?